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WHERE BREAKING GLASS CEILINGS  
LEADS TO GLASS WALLS:   
GENDER-DISPARATE MANAGERIAL  
DECISION-MAKING POWER AND AUTHORITY 
Bina Nayee* 
 
Today, litigation over plainly discriminatory employment practices is 
much less common than it was in the two decades following Title VII’s 
enactment as employers have largely reformed practices that most obviously 
violate employment discrimination law.  But many less obvious employment 
practices, particularly those embedded in implicit bias or unconscious sex 
stereotyping, remain.  One example is employers’ distribution of managerial 
decision-making power and authority based on assumptions about sex.  
Although this particular employment practice has not yet been litigated, 
there is a strong argument that a legal challenge to this practice could 
succeed. 
This Note argues that female managers can and should seek legal redress 
under Title VII when they are given less decisional authority under 
conditions that can only be explained by some implicit bias or sex 
stereotyping.  Both disparate treatment theory and disparate impact theory 
provide viable paths for a litigant to pursue.  Upon weighing the incentives 
and drawbacks under each theory, this Note concludes that disparate 
treatment theory offers the most promising and beneficial remedial pathway 
for potential litigants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While employers have grown increasingly more compliant with 
employment laws that bar overt forms of sex discrimination in the workplace, 
they have failed to address less perceptible but critical forms of inequity.  As 
one scholar notes, “Smoking guns— . . . [like a] rejection explained by the 
comment that ‘this is no job for a woman’—are largely things of the past. . . .  
Cognitive bias, structures of decision making, and patterns of interaction 
have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier of much continued 
inequality.”1  Existing literature addresses unconscious discrimination that 
prevents women from ever reaching desirable management positions.2  
However, there is little attention paid to the discrimination women face even 
after breaking the so-called “glass ceiling.” 
One manifestation of this subtle discrimination is in the distribution of 
authority and decision-making power between men and women in 
managerial positions.  This Note defines this problem as gender inequity in 
decision-making processes.  Although women are increasingly attaining 
managerial titles, these titles often carry a lower level of meaningful authority 
 
 1. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–60 (2001) (footnote omitted). 
 2. See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling:  The Maternal Wall as a 
Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
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than is expected from men in the same roles.3  For example, it is problematic 
that sex or gender stereotyping results in female managers receiving 
decision-making power over less financially important divisions in their 
workplace.  Another troubling consequence is female managers receiving 
less authority over high-profile projects or personnel than their male 
colleagues.4 
When such discrimination occurs to female managers at the higher 
echelons of decision-making, it is hard to believe that they can achieve 
redress from their employers, who have created and sustained the inequity.  
No litigation seeking relief for unequal decision-making power exists.  Thus, 
it appears that female managers facing gender inequity in decision-making 
processes have no path toward reform or redress. 
Courts have not sufficiently addressed or relieved subtle forms of 
employment discrimination.5  There exists litigation and literature addressing 
employees who are harmed by managers’ excessively subjective decision-
making processes, but few courts or scholars tackle the disparate power 
between decision makers themselves.6  The law must grapple with the 
inequity that exists among individuals in the decision-making bodies 
themselves.7 
Despite the absence of case law addressing gender inequity in decision-
making processes, this Note argues that Title VII provides a cause of action 
for female managers who face this form of discrimination.  Part I introduces 
the existence and causes of disparate decisional roles that male and female 
managers assume, and why this problem matters.  Part II presents the 
evolution of Title VII’s application to sex discrimination claims.  It also 
presents the procedural and substantive legal requirements for filing a viable 
employment discrimination suit.  Part III applies two separate Title VII legal 
 
 3. See generally Barbara F. Reskin & Catherine E. Ross, Jobs, Authority and Earnings 
Among Managers:  The Continuing Significance of Sex, 14 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 342 (1992) 
(describing ways in which female managers’ professional experiences differ from their male 
counterparts). 
 4. See, e.g., Mohamad G. Alkadry et al., Beyond Representation:  Gender, Authority, 
and City Managers, REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN., 2017, at 1, 15–16 (describing the sex 
disparity in municipal managers’ “authority profile,” which considers the budget amount and 
personnel that a manger oversees); Caroline Fairchild, More Women Business Leaders Does 
Not Mean More Power, FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/09/24/women-
boards-power/ [https://perma.cc/4RAH-ZS79].  Fairchild explains that women in senior 
management positions are concentrated in service or support roles rather than operational 
roles. Id.  The high concentration of women in “service” management positions supports the 
findings that even as managers, women are generally confined to less important projects. 
 5. Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities:  Race, Retaliation, and the Promise of Title VII, 
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 540–44 (2003) (providing examples of subtle forms of 
discrimination that have not seen legal redress). 
 6. See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 
56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 743 (2005); Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking 
Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299, 1331 (1995). 
 7. See Beth Mintz & Daniel H. Krymkowski, The Ethnic, Race, and Gender Gaps in 
Workplace Authority:  Changes over Time in the United States, 51 SOC. Q. 20, 20–21 (2010) 
(explaining that gender-disparate authority remains even after the influx of women into 
management positions in the late twentieth century). 
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theories to gender inequity in managerial decision-making processes and 
concludes that a disparate treatment suit presents the most promising legal 
avenue for a plaintiff.  Part III also identifies existing roadblocks to the 
proposed use of Title VII.  After addressing these hurdles, this Note 
concludes that courts should recognize that the next stage of Title VII’s 
evolution is tackling this new frontier of unconscious or subtle sex-based 
discrimination. 
I.  INEQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGERIAL 
DECISION-MAKING POWER AND AUTHORITY 
Understanding the gravity of the discriminatory distribution of managerial 
decision-making power is essential to recognizing managers’ need for a legal 
remedy.  Where female managers cannot resolve such discrimination through 
internal workplace channels, their careers depend on a viable form of legal 
redress.  Part I.A explains several ways in which disparate managerial 
decision-making power and authority manifest in the workplace.  Part I.B 
identifies possible causes behind this problem, which are necessary to 
demonstrate at trial if a manager files a suit against her employer.  Part I.C 
highlights the value that alleviating this form of discrimination will have for 
employers, the managers that experience inequity, and their subordinates. 
A.  Manifestations of the Problem 
Imagine a woman who began working with her employer as a low-ranking 
employee.  She worked her way to a supervisory level and was later promoted 
to a managerial role.  She possesses years of experience and the requisite 
education to wholly justify her promotions.  Over time, however, she begins 
to notice subtle but substantive differences between her authority and that of 
her male colleagues in the same position.  She consistently manages fewer 
personnel and has decisional power over projects with less financial 
importance.8  In fact, she manages a noticeably smaller proportion and less 
financially impactful segment of the department’s budget.  When she offers 
her input on larger, more impactful financial decisions, nothing comes of it.  
Her employer distributes work informally in an open market, yet she is never 
able to assume her title’s power and authority to the same degree as many of 
her male colleagues.9 
To some, this is merely the way that their workplaces operate, and they see 
nothing discriminatory about it.  Rather, such decisional power distribution 
is perceived as a consequence of the employer’s informal infrastructure, 
which lacks objective evaluative metrics or a structured hierarchical chain of 
command.  But in fact, these processes reflect an ingrained discriminatory 
 
 8. See generally Alkadry et al., supra note 8 (presenting data showing that female city 
managers direct a disproportionately smaller number of employees and oversee a smaller 
portion of their agency’s budget than their male counterparts). 
 9. Power can be defined as “control over resources, people, and things,” and a manager’s 
decision-making authority exercises that power. See James R. Elliott & Ryan A. Smith, Race, 
Gender, and Workplace Power, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 365, 366 (2004). 
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outlook.  As Susan Sturm acknowledged in her piece, “Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach,” “Structures of 
decisionmaking, opportunity, and power fail to surface these patterns of 
exclu[ding nondominant groups], and themselves produce differential access 
and opportunity.”10  This differential access and opportunity, specifically 
with regard to decisional processes, exist across all employment sectors, not 
just corporate ones.11  Therefore, this Note does not focus solely on corporate 
managers in its analysis. 
One explanation for gender gaps in decisional power and authority is that 
women are simply entering managerial roles that offer less authority than 
other types of managerial positions.12  However, this Note addresses a very 
particular circumstance in which there exists unequal gender-based 
decisional authority between men and women holding the same role or rank.  
Regardless of the decisional power and authority inherent across various 
managerial positions, employers’ sex-based distribution of power among 
those with the same position is legally impermissible. 
B.  Causes and Contributing Factors 
Gender inequity in decision-making processes can manifest in a variety of 
ways, and it follows that there are differing causes behind this problem.  First, 
employers’ inertia and their continuing “homosocial reproduction” are 
interrelated causes behind the inequitable allocation of decisional power and 
authority.  Second, employers’ reliance on soft skills linked to sex or sex 
stereotypes associated with a managerial role can contribute to the problem.  
Third, employers’ unclear guidance or informal processes for distributing 
decisional power can contribute to the gender disparity.  Fourth, the temporal 
order in which male and female managers exercise their power can cause and 
even perpetuate the gender disparity.  Finally, the opportunities that an 
employer provides for managers to develop projects over which they will 
exercise power can contribute to the problem. 
Organizational inertia and homosocial reproduction, a pair of related 
phenomena, are responsible for gender-disparate decision-making power.13  
Until the late twentieth century, men maintained a virtual monopoly over 
managerial roles, which was ascribed, to a great degree, by sex.14  Against 
this historical backdrop, employers developed an untested assumption that 
managerial roles are closely associated with male traits, and, in some cases, 
“management was equated with masculinity.”15  Employers that do not 
investigate or reform their distribution of managerial responsibilities 
continue to adhere to the historical norms and assumptions, which are 
 
 10. Sturm, supra note 1, at 460 (emphasis added). 
 11. Elliott & Smith, supra note 9, at 366. 
 12. See Mintz & Krymkowski, supra note 7, at 38. 
 13. Barbara F. Reskin & Debra Branch McBrier, Why Not Ascription? Organizations’ 
Employment of Male and Female Managers, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 210, 212 (2000). 
 14. Id. at 211. 
 15. Id. 
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predisposed to favor men based on their sex.16  Employers’ inaction can be 
conscious and protective.17  From their perspective, turning away from 
historical norms may be considered a risky business decision because the 
business’s management impacts productivity and profit.18  Continuing to 
assign responsibilities to those who fit the traditional mold is deemed a safer 
option because it offers employers predictability.19  Despite these seemingly 
rational business calculations, employer inertia is irrational and 
discriminatory when, by default, male managers are consistently allocated 
more decisional power than their more capable female counterparts.  Even in 
instances where male managers are equally skilled or qualified, it remains 
discriminatory for employers to unfailingly assume that one sex will 
outperform the other. 
Employers’ consistent predisposition towards male managers also reveals 
a clear reliance on sex as a basis for power distribution, which is known as 
homosocial reproduction.20  Employers continue to distribute power, 
authority, and discretion to those that they identify as in-group members of 
the workplace, which in the managerial context is most often white men.21  
Data reflects that the percentage of women in an occupation contributes 
negatively to the authority differential between men and women.22  
Specifically, jobs comprised of fewer women reflect greater gender gaps in 
authority.  Even the education level between male and female managers does 
not contribute to such a differential.23  Such data supports the theory of 
homosocial reproduction as a contributing factor behind gender-disparate 
decisional power. 
Sex- or gender-linked stereotypical traits are a second cause of gender 
inequity in managerial decision-making power.  Specifically, the closer the 
perceived relationship between a soft quality and a particular gender, the 
more weight the evaluator will give to that quality.24  Women are often 
associated with being more emotional and less objective decision-makers.25  
 
 16. Id. at 212–13. 
 17. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & GILLIAN LESTER, EMPLOYMENT LAW 192 (2008) 
(discussing research which indicates that employers make “personnel investment[s]” in their 
historical workforce populations, leaving them unwilling to accommodate newer, minority 
workers). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Reskin & McBrier, supra note 13, at 212.  The authors discuss employer rationales 
behind employers retaining more men in management jobs overall; however, the same 
rationale applies to distributing actual power and authority away from men once women 
assume the same managerial titles. Id. 
 20. Elliott & Smith, supra note 9, at 369. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See Mintz & Krymkowski, supra note 7, at 35. 
 23. Id.  Men, however, do experience a greater return on their educational investment. Id. 
at 23. 
 24. Susan T. Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial:  Use of Sex Stereotyping 
Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1051 (1991). 
 25. See generally THERESE HUSTON, HOW WOMEN DECIDE:  WHAT’S TRUE, WHAT’S NOT, 
AND WHAT STRATEGIES SPARK THE BEST CHOICES 29–40 (2016) (describing ways in which 
women are considered to be inferior decision makers). 
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Despite the research finding that men are in fact more eager to take risks and 
act with less control in times of stress,26 both men and women tend to be 
more skeptical of women’s decision-making skills.27  Research shows that 
men are much more reactive when their decisions indicate a level of 
achievement, which leads them to make more disadvantageous decisions.28  
In contrast, women typically reflect more balanced decision-making because 
their decision-making ability is less reactive to achievement stress.29  
Specifically, women exhibit less mental disruption about their decision-
making and perform better in stressful situations that test for achievement.30  
Despite such findings, employers’ institutional reliance on stereotypes 
contributes to gender inequity in decision-making processes. 
Employers’ implicit gender bias can also be reflected in their professional-
development training for managers in positions that are socially labeled as 
masculine.  Women in predominantly “male” manager roles are “often 
regarded as less capable and are therefore denied access to the training 
needed to succeed regardless of whether they comply with organizational 
norms.”31  Unequal training can come in the form of a female manager’s 
projects, which have comparatively lower financial importance or 
complexity than to those of her male colleagues.  Projects can offer managers 
the opportunity to gain increased institutional knowledge and hone their 
skills.  When male managers are given decisional authority over substantive, 
challenging, or significant projects, they can learn and professionally develop 
more than their female counterparts.  Emphasizing an employment position’s 
social label as masculine or feminine can cause employers to perpetuate 
gender inequity in decisional processes by professionally supporting some 
managers more than others. 
A third contributing factor is employers’ evaluation and work distribution 
systems, which can amplify sex stereotypes and biases.  Many workplaces 
today have shifted away from the traditional, hierarchical management 
structure and instead have adopted informal or even completely unstructured 
processes to evaluate managers.32  Sex discrimination more likely exists 
where the metrics used to review employees are vague or unclear.33  Vague 
evaluative metrics cause the employer or persons reviewing managers to 
 
 26. See id. at 146–53; Ruud van den Bos et al., Stress and Decision-Making in Humans:  
Performance Is Related to Cortisol Reactivity, Albeit Differently in Men and Women, 34 
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1449, 1454–55 (2009) (explaining that men exhibit higher 
cortisol levels when making decisions in stressful conditions, which makes them more 
immediately sensitive to rewards than women in the same conditions). 
 27. See HUSTON, supra note 25, at 21. 
 28. E.g., van den Bos, supra note 26, at 1455. 
 29. Id.; see HUSTON, supra note 25, at 221–29. 
 30. See van den Bos, supra note 26, at 1454–55.  The authors note that in their experiment, 
men performed more poorly because of their focus on meeting a goal, whereas women 
balanced the risks and benefits better to achieve higher performance. Id. at 1455. 
 31. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1111 
(2014). 
 32. See Susan Sturm, Race, Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace:  
Some Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 639–40 (1998). 
 33. See Fiske et al., supra note 24, at 1050. 
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instead rely on stereotypic metrics.34  As applied to decisional power, a less 
systematic management regime might not offer an objective basis for 
assigning managers to certain projects and subordinates.35  Informal 
evaluations therefore also remove the assurance that all individuals in 
decision-making positions are exercising their power equitably.  Without 
structured, objective metrics to abide by, evaluators’ underlying gender 
biases towards particular groups are more likely to emerge and manifest in 
assigning or reviewing decision-making power and authority.36  In the long 
run, this means that employers’ implicit biases become a proxy for merit-
based justifications behind the amount of decisional power that managers are 
given. 
Fourth, the temporal nature of managers’ decision-making power can 
cement the gender imbalance based on employers’ self-fulfilling prophecies 
about their abilities.  Specifically, there may exist a “dogsled problem” 
whereby women have decision-making powers over the preparation of a 
project, yet lose or concede these powers to men on “race day,” or at the 
zenith of a project.37  The sheer fact that some female managers will exercise 
their decision-making authority prior to their male colleagues can cause it to 
be considered inferior.  Female managers will often strategically assemble 
and direct subordinates to fulfill a project’s objective, but they are then forced 
to defer to male managers when it comes time to present the project’s 
conclusions to a client or to make the final, more public execution of the 
project.38  In this instance, the sequence and appearance of the different 
decision-making powers that men and women exhibit can lead employers, 
and even the public, to form an implicit bias that the male decision makers 
have executed all of the critical decisions.39  Moreover, placing men at the 
forefront of final decisions gives credence to the notion that they deserve to 
be rewarded with even greater decision-making powers in the future.40  Such 
a conclusion can lead to a self-perpetuating cycle.  Thus, the times at which 
male and female managers exercise their decisional power and authority can 
cause a substantial disparity in their perceived and actual decisional power 
and authority. 
Finally, the types of opportunities that certain managers are directed 
toward can contribute to women holding unequal decision-making power in 
the form of substantively inferior or lower-profile projects.  By way of 
illustration, some law firms provide male partners with more opportunities to 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. (noting that “when [evaluative] information about [an employee] is ambiguous, it 
is most open to interpretation” and that “subjective judgments of interpersonal skills and 
collegiality are quite vulnerable to stereotypic biases”).”)” 
 36. See Sturm, supra note 32, at 665. 
 37. Kathy Caprino, How Decision-Making Is Different Between Men and Women and 
Why It Matters in Business, FORBES (May 12, 2016, 10:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/kathycaprino/2016/05/12/how-decision-making-is-different-between-men-and-women-
and-why-it-matters-in-business/ [https://perma.cc/23UH-3ELJ]. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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develop new business relationships while maintaining female “service 
partners” who instead churn out the work.41  The ability to network for and 
acquire new clients, cases, or projects represents opportunities for female 
partners to collect and exercise great decision-making power.  Although the 
role of a law firm partner is not identical to a manager in other professions, 
the underlying problem plaguing female partners at law firms is similar to 
that facing female managers who must also network informally to obtain 
projects that require substantive decisional power and authority.  Without 
employers allowing them an equal opportunity to network or investing equal 
resources in their professional development, female managers cannot make 
the connections necessary to augment their decision-making powers at the 
same pace as their male colleagues. 
Pinpointing the causes behind disparate levels of managerial decision-
making power between men and women in a workplace is critical for an 
individual seeking legal redress.  Being able to identify, describe, and 
substantiate the discriminatory employment practice resulting in the 
inequitable level of decisional power helps a manager convince a jury or a 
judge that her disparate treatment is based on systematic but subtle 
discrimination. 
C.  Why Gender-Disparate Decision-Making Power Matters 
Workplaces and employees stand to gain from removing discriminatory 
barriers to managerial decision-making power.  In addition to the job-specific 
knowledge that female managers have, research has demonstrated that 
certain traits more common in women can benefit workplaces.  For example, 
the level of social sensitivity in a group has been found to be a significant 
predictor of its collective intelligence.42  Women are associated with higher 
levels of social sensitivity than men.43  Thus, employers can foster more 
productive group decision-making where they give women the equal 
opportunity contribute meaningfully.  This is just one way that female 
managers can bring value and uniquely contribute to the productivity in their 
workplaces. 
From the employee perspective, disparate decisional power and authority 
robs female managers of an equal status among their colleagues and the self-
worth that comes with it.  Employment “not only provides the means to live; 
it also confers social status, dignity, and a sense of self.”44  Further, in the 
most obvious sense, it is inherently unfair for an employee to work toward a 
management position and ultimately find herself unable to exercise the 
decisional authority associated with her job because of her sex.  The gender 
 
 41. Elizabeth Olson, Lawsuit Presses the Issue of Lower Pay for Female Law Partners, 
N.Y. TIMES:  DEALBOOK (May 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/07/business/ 
dealbook/law-firm-pay-gender-bias.html [https://perma.cc/5QA9-5YEV]. 
 42. See Anita Williams Woolley et al., Evidence for a Collective Intelligence Factor in 
the Performance of Human Groups, 330 SCIENCE 686, 688 (2010). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1005–06. 
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gap also sets an unfair precedent that limits future female managers from 
exercising the power inherently associated with their positions. 
In addition to concerns about dignity and fairness, the manager’s material 
earnings and career trajectories are also jeopardized.  If a manager has been 
given lesser decisional power over a long period of time, her pay is unlikely 
to remain at parity with her male colleagues who have been given greater 
decisional power.  Therefore, her salary trajectory will be diminished from 
years of not being given the power, and therefore not being able to 
demonstrate her ability, to make high-level decisions. 
Gender inequity in managerial decision-making power is a unique and 
important problem stemming from a diversity of causes.  It leaves female 
managers in a unique position where they appear to have cracked the glass 
ceiling but continue to face an infrastructural barrier that limits their career, 
pay, and dignity.  Female managers can and should utilize the most 
appropriate resource to break the glass walls they face:  the law. 
II.  A BACKGROUND IN GENDER IMBALANCED DECISION-MAKING 
POWER AND SEX DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Following a foundational understanding of gender inequity in managerial 
decisional power and authority, this Part lays out the legal framework 
pertinent to this problem.  Specifically, Part II explains employment 
discrimination law and its appropriateness as a remedy for managers.  Part 
II.A explains why managers require a legal remedy to this problem rather 
than pursuing alternative measures.  Part II.B introduces employment 
discrimination law and its evolution and concludes with an overview of 
where the law stands today.  Part II.C describes the various procedural 
requirements that a potential claimant must meet in order to file a viable 
lawsuit.  Part II.D first illustrates a different legal theory that a claimant can 
pursue as part of her suit and the practical mechanics behind that theory.  It 
then offers a brief overview of the remedies available to a successful 
claimant. 
A.  Why the Law Must Address This Problem 
A growing number of scholars contend that seeking legal redress for 
implicit forms of employment discrimination, such as unequal decision-
making power, is not promising.45  However, this Note disagrees with that 
perspective because the alternative is to rely on employers undertaking their 
 
 45. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Progressive Lawyering in Politically Depressing Times:  
Can New Models for Institutional Self-Reform Achieve More Effective Structural Change?, 
30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 323, 323–25 (2007). 
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own reforms.  Even with increased research46 and journalism47 that addresses 
the fault in labeling jobs by sex- or gender-based traits, employers continue 
to rely on implicit biases and stereotypes.48  Any employer initiative would 
need to come from a group of high-level decision makers in the workplace—
the same group perpetuating the discrimination at issue.  It is unlikely that 
change will actually arise internally. Instead, an external force, such as the 
law, is required for employers to become incentivized to recognize and 
actively root out the subtle, impactful sex discrimination in their workplaces. 
Seeking a legal remedy to gender inequity in the decision-making 
processes is important for both the individuals directly impacted by the 
inequity as well as for their coworkers.  Employees perceive their workplace 
to be more diverse when they see female leaders.49  The diversity of gender 
among managers also has the potential to affect personnel policies such as 
hiring and compensation.50  Yet if female managers cannot exercise the 
decisional power that is expected to correlate with their positions, then 
having more women in these roles is essentially meaningless.  Moreover, 
managers who face inequitable decision-making power will not stay long 
with their employer; rather, they will seek opportunities in equitable 
workplaces.51  Even if these managers leave and are replaced by other female 
managers, the same possibility of attrition remains. 
Gender inequity in managerial decision-making processes simultaneously 
causes employees to face culturally incompetent human resources (HR) 
policies.  When decision-making bodies are nominally diverse but practically 
homogenous, the programs and policies they create will reflect closed-group 
thinking.52  Managerial decisions impact employees’ lives in material ways.  
By offering only one managerial group’s view of healthcare, childcare, job 
protection, and other job-related benefits, employers may end up presenting 
 
 46. See, e.g., id.; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 
1200 (1995); Reskin & McBrier, supra note 13, at 210. 
 47. See, e.g., Stav Ziv, Male and Female Co-Workers Switched Email Signatures, Faced 
Sexism, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 10, 2017, 4:34 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/male-and-female-
coworkers-switched-email-signatures-faced-sexism-566507 [https://perma.cc/5GV4-46MF]. 
 48. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping:  Using Social Science to 
Litigate Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the “Cluelessness” Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. 
& EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 408–09 (2003) (“Managers themselves described successful women 
managers as more competent, active, and potent than women as a whole; however, these same 
managers described women managers as ‘decidedly more deficient’ in these qualities than 
their male counterparts.”). 
 49. Cailin S. Stamarski & Leanne S. Son Hing, Gender Inequalities in the Workplace:  
The Effects of Organizational Structures, Processes, Practices, and Decision Makers’ Sexism, 
6 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL., Sept. 2015, at 1, 6. 
 50. Reskin & McBrier, supra note 13, at 211. 
 51. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1062 (explaining that even employers’ seemingly 
neutral methods for executing gender-biased employment decisions can drive women away 
from their high-ranking jobs or the workforce entirely). 
 52. See Stamarski & Hing, supra note 49, at 3 (“HR-related decision-making occurs when 
organizational decision makers (i.e., managers, supervisors, or HR personnel) employ HR 
policy to determine how it will be applied to a particular situation and individual.”). 
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insufficient or limited HR support to their employees.53  It is unrealistic to 
expect that the same decision-making bodies that need to be reformed will 
implement policies to ensure that its members are given truly equal decision-
making power.  That is why this Note explores the viability and effect that 
litigation can have in response to gender-disparate managerial decision 
making. 
B.  A Brief History and Evolution of Sex Discrimination Law 
Two employment laws largely form the basis for sex-based discrimination 
litigation:  (1) the Equal Pay Act and (2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  The Equal Pay Act pertains to employees’ compensation—not other 
practices in a workplace, such as unequal decision-making power—and is 
therefore inapplicable to this Note.54  Title VII, on the other hand, offers 
promising legal redress for novel causes of action.  This statute prohibits 
employment practices that discriminate against employees on the basis of 
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.55  Further, it protects employees 
who are both experiencing discrimination and openly opposing it.56 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that Title VII is meant 
to remove arbitrary barriers to “professional development that ha[ve] 
historically been encountered by women and . . . other minorities.”57  
Importantly, later legislative history, discussing the need to amend Title VII, 
indicates that Congress understood employment discrimination law to extend 
beyond “intentional wrongs” and to address complex infrastructural 
problems.58 
This Note focuses exclusively on Title VII as a remedy for unequal 
decision-making power among managers.  Courts have recognized Title VII 
sex discrimination claims arising from a variety of discriminatory 
employment practices, including job assignments, transfers, promotions, 
prerequisite tests for employment, and hiring practices.59  Title VII’s 
application to employee assignments and transfers reflects the statute’s broad 
prohibition on employment practices unassociated with compensation or 
 
 53. See id. at 3–4. 
 54. 29 U.S.C. §  206(d) (2012). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 56. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013) (explaining 
that Title VII protects employees who oppose discriminatory employment practices or file a 
complaint alleging employment discrimination). 
 57. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 (1982) (explaining the purpose behind Title 
VII). 
 58. S. REP. NO. 92-415, at 5 (1971).  The report on this proposed amendment to Title VII 
stated, “Employment discrimination as viewed today is a . . . complex and pervasive 
phenomenon.  Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms 
of ‘systems’ and ‘effects’ rather than simply intentional wrongs . . . .” Id. 
 59. See generally Russell Specter & Paul J. Spiegelman, Annotation, Employment 
Discrimination Action Under Federal Civil Rights Acts, 21 Am. Jur. Trials 1 (2017) (providing 
examples of various sex discrimination cases). 
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other material awards to employees.60  Analogously, managerial decisional 
power is not immediately associated with compensation or other material 
reward, but rather a difference in job conditions.  Although disputes over 
distributing unequal managerial decision-making power have not made their 
way to the courts, Title VII contains two provisions in support of such a 
claim.  Each of these provisions is analyzed in greater detail in Part III. 
Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees 
on certain bases.  The two relevant provisions of the statute make it unlawful 
for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.61 
Congress’s inclusion of the term “sex” as a basis for Title VII 
discrimination was a late amendment to the statute but should be granted 
equal importance to the other bases.62  Representative Howard Smith 
proposed the term in an amendment two days before the bill passed the 
House, stating that it would help white women to compete for employment 
against prospective African American female candidates.63  This opinion was 
not unique.  Representative Martha Griffiths also relied on a race-based 
rationale to justify the prohibition of sex-based discrimination in the bill.64  
Although there is no official record of the individual votes for the 
amendment, it is understood that its support largely derived from 
Republicans and Southern Democrats in Congress.65  This same coalition of 
congressmen disfavored civil rights for African Americans.66  It is widely 
believed that some of the amendment’s proponents intended to use the 
amendment to defeat the bill’s passage in Congress.67  Other legislators 
 
 60. See generally Daniel M. Le Vay, Annotation, Sex Discrimination in Job Assignment 
or Transfer as Violation of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 123 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (2011) 
(collecting cases of unlawful employment practices). 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 62. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1014–15. 
 63. See 110 CONG. REC. 2583 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Smith).  Despite his stated position, 
Smith’s proposal is thought to have been intended to quash the bill. See Schultz, supra note 
31, at 1014–16.  In fact, Smith did not vote for the amended bill’s passage through the House. 
110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964). 
 64. See CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX:  THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S ISSUES, 
1945–1968, at 179 (1988). 
 65. See Katherine Krimmel, Rights by Fortune or Fight?  Re-Examining the Addition of 
Sex to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 2 (Jan 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. (manuscript at 6, 11). 
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voiced concerns about the potentially harmful ramifications of the bill’s 
broadened scope, with the inclusion of amendments such as sex-based 
discrimination.68 
Given the amendment’s late inclusion in the bill, the conventional 
interpretation is that the legislative history does not reflect a coherent 
legislative intent to combat sex discrimination.69  Yet, some congressional 
intent to make sex a meaningful component of the bill can be gleaned from 
the multiple opportunities that congressmen had, but did not take, to remove 
the term “sex.”70  One scholar argues that, in fact, some members of Congress 
possessed political will to include sex as a status protected from 
discrimination.71  In the decades preceding the proposal of the sex 
discrimination amendment, feminist coalitions so consistently—and it seems 
effectively—advocated for such statutory reform that the Republican and 
Southern Democratic electorates eventually reflected an inclination to afford 
greater legal rights to women by the mid-twentieth century.72  Therefore, the 
conventional wisdom that there was not a true congressional intent behind 
the inclusion of sex-based discrimination in Title VII, or that it was nothing 
more than a tactic to defeat the bill, does not convey the whole story.  Besides 
reflecting political willpower to enhance legal protections for women, the 
plain statutory language requires that sex discrimination be afforded the same 
seriousness as Title VII’s other bases for discrimination. 
Soon after Title VII’s passage, sex discrimination did not receive much 
priority.  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) officials 
tasked with furthering Title VII’s implementation initially considered sex-
based discrimination to be unimportant.73  The first successful cases delving 
into sex-based discrimination claims rested on applying the statute’s plain 
meaning to the most obvious instances of discrimination.  For instance, the 
Supreme Court held that an employer violated Title VII where it accepted 
only male applicants with preschool children without considering female 
applicants with children.74  Sexual harassment claims, however, were not 
initially regarded as an obvious form of sex discrimination.  They posed 
greater difficulty for plaintiffs because courts could not rely on legislative 
history to determine whether the alleged misconduct was within the statute’s 
scope.75  As demonstrated by early case law, the courts were reluctant to 
 
 68. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (statement of Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking the Committee to “[i]magine the upheaval that would result 
from adoption of blanket language requiring total equality”). 
 69. See Krimmel, supra note 65 (manuscript at 2). 
 70. Id. (manuscript at 3). 
 71. Id. (manuscript at 2). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Multiple EEOC directors conveyed that sex discrimination was a lesser concern for 
the agency and voiced an intent to avoid becoming known as the “sex commission.” See 
HARRISON, supra note 64, at 187–89. 
 74. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971). 
 75. See Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) 
(distinguishing Title VII’s purpose, based on judicial interpretations of its legislative history, 
from a remedy to sexual harassment), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); see also Barnes 
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apply the statute beyond instances of plain violations.  The first district courts 
to review this issue in the late 1970s denied sexual harassment claims, and 
they did not recognize unwanted sexual advances in the workplace as 
inextricably sex-based.76  The courts reasoned that Title VII did not apply to 
a plaintiff faced with sexual harassment because the treatment she received 
was prompted by her decision to reject her supervisor’s advances against her 
and not on her sex.77  Ultimately, many of these district courts were reversed 
years later by their circuit courts, which recognized that the sexual advances 
that plaintiffs faced were prompted by their sex as females.78 
In 1989, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins79 expanded 
its interpretation of sex-based discrimination to include an employer’s 
reliance on sex stereotypes to deny a promotion to a female employee.80  In 
Price Waterhouse, the Court held that disparate treatment based on sex exists 
where an employer expects female employees to conform to behavioral 
stereotypes, such as speaking “more femininely” or wearing makeup.81  
Importantly, the Court interpreted Title VII’s language to “mean that gender 
must be irrelevant to employment decisions.”82  By going beyond the word 
“sex” and including the term “gender” in Title VII’s purview, the Court 
recognized that the statute applied to societally constructed roles for each 
sex.  In doing so, the Court expanded Title VII’s scope beyond a mere 
biological distinction of sex and recognized that it encompasses social 
expectations of sex, too.83 
Nearly a decade later, the Court in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 
Inc.84 reiterated a broad conception of Title VII.  Acknowledging that the 
statute’s application does not end with the “principal evil” that the legislature 
intended to dissolve at the time of the statute’s enactment, the Court 
 
v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 986–87 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“Unfortunately, the early history of [Title 
VII] lends no assistance to endeavors to define the scope of [sex discrimination] more 
precisely, if indeed any elucidation were needed.”).  The Barnes court ultimately found the 
Title VII applied to sexual harassment but it did so on the basis of legislative clarifications 
about Title VII in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Supreme Court’s 
progressive interpretation of the statute in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971), and its fellow circuit courts’ application of Title VII to a variety of sex-based barriers 
in the workplace. Id. at 987. 
 76. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), 
rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 
1976), rev’d, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979); Barnes v. Train, No. 1828-73, 1974 WL 10628 
(D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1974), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 77. See, e.g., Barnes, 1974 WL 10628, at *1 (“The substance of plaintiff’s complaint is 
that she was discriminated against, not because she was a woman, but because she refused to 
engage in a sexual affair with her supervisor.  This is a controversy underpinned by the 
subtleties of an inharmonious personal relationship.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Barnes, 561 F.2d at 989. 
 79. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 80. Id. at 250–51. 
 81. Id. at 235. 
 82. Id. at 240. 
 83. See id. at 244 (finding that “an employer may not take gender into account”). 
 84. 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
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recognized that the law extends to “reasonably comparable evils.”85  Thus, it 
is fitting to include gender inequity in decisional processes as actionable 
under Title VII because it is a comparable evil to the more obvious 
discriminatory practices, and it is rooted in impermissible employer policies 
such as sex stereotyping. 
C.  Qualifications for Bringing a Title VII Claim 
In addition to understanding Title VII’s statutory history and evolution, it 
is important to address the basic procedural requirements for litigants to bring 
a viable suit under this statute.  Title VII does not apply to all employment 
relationships and practices.  To qualify as an “employer” under Title VII, the 
person or business entity must be in an industry affecting commerce.86  
Further, the employer must employ fifteen or more persons for each working 
day in each of twenty or more weeks in the current or previous year.87  An 
employee is anyone employed by such an employer, with the exception of 
individuals holding state or local public office, or their personal staff or 
policy advisors.88 
Employment discrimination suits may be brought by the EEOC,89 the 
Attorney General behalf of the United States in alleged “pattern-or-practice” 
discrimination cases,90 or by a private party.91  A charging party must file its 
claim with the EEOC within 180 days, or about six months, following the 
alleged unlawful employment practice’s occurrence.92  The EEOC must act 
upon cases within a limited statutory period.93  If the agency fails to review 
cases expeditiously, it must notify the charging party, which then has ninety 
days to file the action in district court.94  If a charging party experiences 
additional events that appear discriminatory, the EEOC may amend the 
original complaint or require that the charging party file another claim 
altogether if the events do not overlap with the existing claim.95 
The EEOC does not have the authority to adjudicate all employment 
disputes on its own.  With respect to nonfederal employers, the agency uses 
its statutory powers to obtain compliance for an employee in the federal 
 
 85. Id. at 75 (applying Title VII to sexual harassment in the form of physical assaults and 
threats of rape towards a heterosexual male from his other male coworkers). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 90. Id. § 2000e-6(a). 
 91. Id. § 2000e-5(b). 
 92. Id. § 2000e-5(e). 
 93. Id. § 2000e-5(f). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/UK5F-A9SA] 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2018); see also, e.g., Bayless v. Ancilla Domini Coll., 781 F. Supp. 2d 
740, 764 (N.D. Ind. 2011). 
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courts.96  For disputes involving federal employers, the EEOC participates in 
the adjudicatory process.97  After a federal employee files a discrimination 
complaint and receives a post-investigation notice from the EEOC, the 
employee may either request a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge 
or request that the federal employer issue a decision over the matter.98  If an 
employee-claimant pursues a hearing, the judge will ultimately issue a 
decision and order relief where it is warranted.99  If the decision favors the 
employee-claimant, the federal employer may still issue its own order 
rejecting the judge’s decision.100  In this event, the federal employee may file 
an appeal with the EEOC and file a civil action in federal district court.101  
Beyond these procedural steps, a successful plaintiff must satisfy the 
substantive requirements for an employment discrimination suit as explained 
in the following section. 
D.  Types of Discrimination Suits 
Under Title VII, an employee may establish an unlawful employment 
practice through one of two legal theories:  disparate treatment or disparate 
impact.  This section presents the prima facie requirements for each theory 
of discrimination as well as plaintiffs’ strategies for successful litigation. 
1.  Disparate Treatment Theory 
Disparate treatment theory concerns employment practices demonstrating 
intentional discrimination, or conduct that is unexplainable by any cause 
other than discrimination, toward an employee based on a protected status 
such as sex.102  All disparate treatment claims are subject to the burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.103  
The framework functions in three steps:  (1) the employee-plaintiff’s prima 
facie burden; (2) the employer’s rebuttal; and (3) the employee-plaintiff’s 
response. 
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  To 
do so, the plaintiff must “demonstrate the following:  (1) she was within the 
protected [Title VII] class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was 
 
 96. Tracy Bateman Farrell et al., Annotation, Introduction to the Equal Opportunity 
Commission, 21 Fed. Proc. Law. Edition § 50:1 (2008). 
 97. Hearings, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/ 
federal/fed_employees/hearing.cfm [https://perma.cc/9DKD-NLAB] (last visited Aug. 24, 
2018). 
 98. Filing a Formal Complaint, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/fed_employees/filing_complaint.cfm [https://perma.cc/3VPE-
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 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Sturm, supra note 1, at 473 & n.45. 
 103. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred 
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”104 
The first three prongs of a prima facie case are fairly straightforward.  The 
fourth and final prong requires the plaintiff to link the employment practice 
with discrimination.  If the plaintiff seeks to establish that the adverse 
employment action was centrally motivated by an impermissible purpose, 
she can refer to those similarly situated to her to demonstrate differential 
treatment.105  She may use also statistical data, similar to that used by class 
action plaintiffs, to support an inference of intentional discrimination.106  By 
way of illustration, the Supreme Court has compared a class’s representation 
and treatment in a given workplace to the class’s existence in the relevant 
labor market.107  Geography and the job itself will define the parameters of 
the “relevant labor market.”108  Similarly, individuals claiming intentional 
discrimination may use statistical evidence to establish the employer’s 
subjective intent to treat them differently based on a protected, minority 
status.109 
In the absence of a single, direct causal link between the employee’s 
minority status and the employer’s differential treatment, a plaintiff can still 
establish a prima facie disparate treatment claim through a mixed-motive 
test.110  Under this analysis, the employee need not establish that the 
discriminatory motive was the sole or primary motive behind the employer’s 
conduct.111  A plaintiff may sufficiently make a claim by establishing that 
the employee’s protected status was a substantial motivating factor behind 
the employment practice.112  The mixed-motive test interprets the statutory 
language, “because of . . . sex,” as having a broader application than was 
earlier interpreted.113  The previous interpretation held that “because of” 
meant that “but for” the employee’s protected status, the employer would not 
have acted in the way it did.114  The current analysis allows employees to 
 
 104. Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 (2d Cir. 2009); accord McDonnell 
Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802–04. 
 105. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:  VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN 
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 106. Id. at 58. 
 107. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307–08 (1977) (explaining that 
statistics can be an important source of proof in employment discrimination cases, and gross 
statistical differences can even establish prima facie proof of discrimination). 
 108. Id. at 308. 
 109. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 58. 
 110. Id.  A mixed-motive test does not extend to retaliation or ADEA claims. See, e.g., 
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an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that 
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introduced in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 113. RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 58–59. 
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establish liability where the employer had both legal and illegal motives, and 
the latter was a factor in the employer’s decision to discriminate against the 
employee.115  In a mixed-motive claim, the court can award attorney’s fees, 
as well as injunctive and declaratory remedies.116 
Second, the burden shifts to the employer if the employee successfully 
meet its prima facie burden.117  The employer must then establish that it had 
a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the employment practice in 
question.118  Specifically, where an employee’s sex is a “bona fide 
occupational qualification” for the job and that qualification is reasonably 
necessary for regular business operations, the employer is not acting 
unlawfully.119  If the employer fails to rebut the discrimination charge, the 
employee prevails. 
Finally, the burden shifts back to the employee-plaintiff if the employer 
establishes sex as a legitimate occupational qualification.120  The employee 
is “given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence 
that the presumptively valid reasons for [the employment action] were in fact 
a coverup for a . . . discriminatory decision.”121  A successful plaintiff must 
establish this by a preponderance of the evidence.122  If the plaintiff 
successfully rebuts the employer’s proposed defense as mere pretext for 
discriminatory practices, the case enters the remedy stage.  When a case 
reaches the remedy stage, the employer assumes the burden of persuasion 
regarding how much it owes the plaintiff in damages.123 
To escape a robust award to the plaintiff, an employer can avail itself of 
an affirmative defense that it would have taken the same action against the 
plaintiff notwithstanding its proven discriminatory motivating factor.124  In 
doing so, the employer can dodge substantive liability, leaving only the 
payment for opposing party’s attorney’s fees and costs.125  However, if the 
employer fails to establish such an affirmative defense, the court may “award 
any type of Title VII relief.”126 
Ultimately, a plaintiff can prevail and seek remedy regardless of whether 
the protected status, such as sex, was the employer’s central motivation or 
one of many motivations behind its unfavorable employment practices.  As 
Part III will discuss in greater detail, disparate treatment theory provides 
 
 115. Frederick K. Grittner, Annotation, Mixed Motives, 9 West’s Fed. Admin. Prac. 
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relief for an employee where her employer consciously or unconsciously 
excludes her from employment opportunities.127 
2.  Disparate Impact Theory 
Disparate impact theory addresses facially neutral employment practices 
that cause a significant discriminatory impact.128  This section presents a 
brief history of disparate impact theory as well as its evolution in meaning 
and import in Title VII jurisprudence.  Thereafter, the section lays out the 
theory’s mechanics and its value to plaintiffs. 
The Supreme Court first recognized the disparate impact theory in Griggs 
v. Duke Power Co.129  In Griggs, the Court recognized a Title VII cause of 
action against a facially neutral employment practice that produced a 
disparate effect on a protected minority class and that was not justified by a 
business necessity.130  Nearly two decades later, however, the Court in Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio131 narrowed the applicability of disparate impact 
theory by increasing the onus on plaintiffs seeking to establish a prima facie 
case.  In Wards Cove, the Court found that an imbalance in race or some other 
minority status among employees is, in and of itself, insufficient to establish 
a prima facie case for disparate impact.132  Rather, the Court in Wards Cove 
set a requirement that plaintiffs must prove:  (1) that there is a disparity 
between the proportion of a minority class in an occupation and the 
proportion of that minority class in the labor market for that occupation;133 
and (2) that a particular employment practice caused this disparity.134  
Additionally, the Court held that the burden remained with the plaintiffs 
through the course of litigation, meaning they would need to disprove a 
defendant’s proposed business-necessity defense, regardless of its 
validity.135  Consequently, under Wards Cove, only a narrow subset of 
claimant cases would be viable.136 
In response to the Court’s decision, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, which appeared to partially broaden a disparate impact claim’s 
scope back to pre-Wards Cove levels.137  One section of the Act expressly 
 
 127. See infra Part III. 
 128. See Sturm, supra note 1, at 467 & n.21. 
 129. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 130. Id. at 431 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that 
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 131. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 132. See generally id. 
 133. Id. at 652–54. 
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 135. Id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 136. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 1099 & n.556. 
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indicated in its legislative history that the discrimination law pertaining to 
causation was to return to the pre-Wards Cove legal doctrine.138  Specifically, 
this legislation effectively reversed the Wards Cove requirement that 
plaintiffs must bear the burden of persuasion throughout a case.  Instead, 
employers are required to propose a business-necessity defense, and they 
must prove that defense’s validity for it to be considered.139  A plaintiff is 
therefore no longer required to rebut a business-necessity defense that is 
invalid.  The Act also permits plaintiffs to argue that certain complex 
employment practices should be reviewed as a single employment process 
rather than as individual elements.140  The Act did not completely reject the 
Court’s decision in Wards Cove, but it did codify the plaintiff’s burden to 
identify the particular employment practice causing the alleged disparate 
impact.141  The Act did not clarify the necessary elements for establishing a 
disparate impact finding.142  Neither the Court nor Congress has clarified 
exactly how to establish such a claim besides using statistical support to show 
disparate impact.143 
Following the Act’s passage in 1991, the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano144 
still maintained a narrow interpretation of disparate impact claims.  In Ricci, 
the Court reviewed a mandatory aptitude test for any New Haven firefighter 
seeking promotion.145  Some critics of the test alleged that it was 
discriminatory because white firefighters were projected to be the test’s 
predominant beneficiaries, and the few minority firefighters still had a 
relatively low chance of receiving the promotion.146  In response, the city of 
New Haven did not certify the test or its results.147   
A class of firefighters who stood to gain promotion from the test results 
sued the city.148  The Court held that New Haven’s refusal to certify the test 
was intentional reverse discrimination, reasoning that the city’s failure to 
certify would have been justified only if it was responding to a legitimate 
 
 138. See id. § 105(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2012)) (“No 
statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 Congressional 
Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legislative history of, or relied 
upon in any way as legislative history in construing or applying, any provision of this Act that 
relates to Wards Cove—Business necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice.”). 
 139. Id. § 104, 105 Stat. at 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e) (defining “demonstrates” 
as “meets the burdens of production and persuasion” where the employer “demonstrates” a 
business necessity defense). 
 140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2012).  The plaintiff must establish that the 
employment process cannot be separated into elements. Id. 
 141. Id.; see also RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 77. 
 142. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 80–81. 
 143. One scholar notes that partly because both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
claims can rely on statistical data, plaintiffs do not have any clear instruction for precisely 
what more they must prove for the latter claim. Id. at 81. 
 144. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 145. Id. at 571. 
 146. Id. at 562. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 562–63. 
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disparate impact claim.149  The Court concluded that minority firefighters 
would not been successful if they brought a disparate impact claim in 
response to the certified test, and it therefore dismissed the possibility of the 
city facing a legitimate disparate impact claim.150  The Court’s decision in 
Ricci effectively hinders well-meaning employers’ abilities to defend against 
reverse discrimination claims, while strengthening all employers’ abilities to 
ward off disparate impact claims.151  Further, it affirms the burden on 
plaintiffs to propose an alternative practice that the employer could have 
pursued to meet its legitimate business needs while having a smaller disparate 
impact.152  Thus, while disparate impact theory once permitted a wide 
breadth of suits, the Court has increasingly narrowed the theory’s 
applicability and expanded the plaintiff’s obligations in making a successful 
case. 
Currently, to establish a prima facie claim, an employee must first establish 
that the employment practice or policy has an unequal impact on a protected 
class.153  To defend against liability, the employer must then successfully 
establish that it is acting due to a business need in question and that the 
challenged practice relates to the job position.154  Only if an employer’s 
business-necessity defense is valid must an employee establish that the 
proposed justification is pretext for discrimination.155 
While disparate impact litigation once provided employees with a vehicle 
to remedy the subtle discriminatory practices or infrastructure in their 
workplaces, the recent litigation over this theory indicates its diminishing 
force.  With increased burdens on the plaintiff, such as presenting an 
alternative feasible employment practice, disparate impact theory produces 
many hurdles for litigants. 
E.  Litigation Remedies 
Title VII’s remedial framework is set up so that a successful charging party 
can be “placed, as near as may be, in the situation [s]he would have occupied 
if the wrong had not been committed.”156  In cases where an employer’s 
 
 149. Id. at 585 (“[B]efore an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the 
asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer 
must have a strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact 
liability . . . .”). 
 150. Id. at 587–90. 
 151. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 105, at 91.  The Court’s holding that New Haven 
unjustifiably discriminated against white firefighters based on race for recognizing that its 
tests produced a negative impact on minority firefighters reflects a reasoning wedded to Wards 
Cove rather than the subsequent Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., 
Reading Amendments and Expansions of Title VII Narrowly, 95 B.U. L. REV. 781, 793 (2015). 
 152. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C) (2012)). 
 153. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).  Employers cannot, however, use the 
business-necessity defense against a disparate treatment claim that alleges that they are 
intentionally discriminating. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Teal, 457 U.S. at 447. 
 156. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975) (quoting Wicker v. 
Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867)). 
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single motive was to discriminate against an employee, the remedy can 
include both injunctive and monetary relief.157  Injunctive relief can “include, 
but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without 
back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”158  
However in the context of a mixed-motive case, if an employer proves that it 
would have committed the same employment practice even without its 
discriminatory motivation, the employee cannot recover damages beyond 
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or attorney’s fees and costs.159 
Monetary relief usually takes the form of compensatory damages, which 
serve to make the plaintiff whole.160  In discrimination cases involving 
federal employers, an additional set of remedies is available, including an 
unconditional offer to place employees where they ought to have been placed 
and a commitment by the employer to take preventative measures in the 
future.161  Federal employees who are discriminated against in ways that 
cannot be remedied with job promotion or placement are owed a “full 
opportunity to participate in the employee benefit denied.”162 
In its 1991 amendment to Title VII, Congress introduced the availability 
of punitive damages against nongovernmental employers in disparate 
treatment, but not disparate impact, cases.163  However, the Supreme Court 
interpreted this amendment narrowly and made such damages available only 
on the basis of employer intent.  An employer who discriminated against 
employees without perceiving even the risk of violating federal law, or who 
acted with a “distinct belief that its discrimination [was] lawful,” is exempt 
from punitive damages.164  Further, the employer is not vicariously 
responsible by way of punitive damages for discriminatory actions by its 
managerial agents.165 
The remedies available from a Title VII claim can impact an individual’s 
choice of discrimination theory as well as her decision to litigate at all.  The 
ensuing analysis delves into determining which legal theory is the most 
promising for a potential plaintiff. 
III.  A PIONEERING SEX DISCRIMINATION SUIT:  TITLE VII LEGAL 
THEORIES APPLIED TO GENDER INEQUITY IN DECISION-MAKING 
While both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims could 
theoretically provide recourse for a manager facing inequitable decisional 
 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(B). 
 160. Id. § 2000e-5(g).  The language of the statute reflects an intent to isolate the available 
remedies for Title VII to only equitable relief. Id.  The subsection lists equitable forms of relief 
for a prevailing charging party followed by the phrase “or any other equitable relief.” Id.  This 
broad final phrase can be read to characterize other actions listed. 
 161. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a) (2017). 
 162. See id. § 1614.501(c)(5). 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)–(b)(1) (2012).  Congress has not enacted additional 
amendments since 1991. 
 164. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536–37 (1999). 
 165. Id. at 545. 
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power, they each present unique hurdles.  This Part will explore how a 
potential plaintiff can approach litigation under either theory to seek relief 
from gender inequity in decisional processes.  Part III.A presents the 
preliminary arguments and statutory interpretation necessary to litigants 
preparing an employment discrimination case.  Part III.B analyzes how a 
litigant would approach a disparate treatment suit and the hurdles she would 
face.  Part III.C analyzes how a litigant would fare in a disparate impact suit 
tackling the same statutory provisions.  Finally, this Part concludes that 
disparate treatment theory offers a more promising path because the risks a 
plaintiff faces can be outweighed by the benefits leading to a successful 
claim. 
A.  Preliminary Considerations for Sex Discrimination Suits 
A manager given disparate decisional power can obtain forceful and long-
lasting relief by utilizing the law.  Although litigation of this exact nature has 
not yet entered state or federal courts,166 Title VII offers both a viable and 
promising resolution to the problem at hand. 
Two provisions in Title VII exist to provide redress to managers for 
disparate decision-making power and authority.167  The first concerns 
whether an employee faces discriminatory terms and conditions during her 
employment; the second concerns whether an employee is limited or 
classified in a way that adversely affects her employment.168  As an initial 
matter, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that novel Title VII actions can 
arise from interpretations of each provision in the statute.169  The Court has 
cautioned that employment practices or procedures that present “built-in 
headwinds” for minority groups are prohibited.170  Moreover, the guidelines 
by which the EEOC reviews sex-based discrimination claims permits the 
agency to address new issues in that arena.171  By acknowledging that the 
agency may continue to review problems relating to sex discrimination on a 
case-by-case basis, the guidelines leave room to bring long-existing 
discriminatory employment practices into court.172  Sexual harassment 
claims serve as a paradigmatic example of Title VII’s evolving interpretation 
beyond obvious applications of the statute. 
While Title VII does not expressly include a sexual harassment claim, 
lawyers and activists utilized Catharine MacKinnon’s scholarship, which 
 
 166. See supra Introduction. 
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012); see supra Part II.A. 
 168. See supra Part II.D. 
 169. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447–48 (1982) (“Title VII [is directed 
toward] ‘the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment’ and 
professional development that had historically been encountered by women . . . .” (quoting 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))). 
 170. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (describing Congress’s intent behind Title VII’s application 
as focused on an employment practice’s consequences, and not merely the employer’s 
motivation). 
 171. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (2017). 
 172. Id. 
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interpreted sexual harassment as a form of sex-based discrimination, to 
prevail in litigation.173  This established sexual harassment as an unlawful 
employment practice.174  In the same vein, it is possible to establish novel 
causes of action against employers whose practices of distributing decisional 
power permit or encourage gender-inequitable decision-making power and 
authority. 
The first pertinent provision of Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer 
“to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” because of her sex.175  To 
apply this provision, a plaintiff must first understand what “terms” and 
“conditions” mean.  Although Title VII does not define “terms and 
conditions,” the statute provides certain examples in the employment 
context:  “grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, [and] hours.”176  
Additionally, litigation pertaining to “hiring, firing, pay, job assignments, 
promotions, layoff, training, fringe benefits” has been considered to fall 
within the terms and conditions of employment.177  Job transfers based on 
sex are also discriminatory.178  The Court has held that terms and conditions 
apply to both contractual provisions and “‘the entire spectrum of disparate 
treatment of men and women’ in employment.”179  With these considerations 
in mind, the next section focuses on disparate treatment theory as applied to 
gender-inequitable decision-making processes and the hurdles this theory 
poses. 
B.  Pursuing a Disparate Treatment Lawsuit 
A novel disparate treatment claim for unequal decision-making powers is 
cognizable based on Title VII precedent.  The Court has understood the 
phrase “because of . . . sex” to include sex stereotyping (i.e., expecting men 
and women to match the social constructs created for their respective 
genders).180  The Court has taken a broad reading of the legislative intent 
behind the text prohibiting sex-based discrimination.181  More recently, the 
Court has further recognized that Title VII extends to “reasonably 
comparable evils” beyond those that Congress originally intended to 
 
 173. Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS 
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 9 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
 174. Id. 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 176. Id. § 2000e(d). 
 177. Sex-Based Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sex.cfm [https://perma.cc/2PTE-F4H5] (last visited Aug. 
24, 2018). 
 178. See, e.g., Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 179. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of 
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 180. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244 (1989). 
 181. Id. at 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for . . . 
‘Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women 
resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting Manhart, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13)). 
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eradicate with Title VII.182  Accordingly, an employee-plaintiff can establish 
a disparate treatment claim by showing that her employer was motivated by 
sex stereotyping.183  The employee-plaintiff may also establish that other 
causes behind gender inequity in decisional processes184 are sex or gender 
based. 
From a manager’s perspective, decision-making power and authority can 
exist within two categories of job terms and conditions:  (1) those which are 
expressly found in work contracts, and (2) those which are presumed to be 
associated with the job title.  Decision-making power may be explicit from a 
manager’s written responsibilities, but such authority is also implied in 
managerial duties.  Recognized terms and conditions, such as job 
assignments and transfers, concern whether an employer changes its 
employees’ substantive duties.  Decision-making power similarly affects 
managers’ substantive duties since it reflects their day-to-day 
responsibilities. 
“The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one 
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to 
which members of the other sex are not exposed.”185  Distributing decisional 
power based on gender stereotypes about a female manager’s personality 
traits,186 assumptions about her sex and race,187 or her socially defined 
responsibilities outside of work188 can all be construed as sex discrimination.  
Arguably, it is an implicit term of a manager’s position that she has an 
equitable share of the incremental decision-making powers that her 
colleagues of the same rank and title obtain.  Therefore, an employee-plaintiff 
may argue that inequitable distribution of power and authority between sexes 
is a disadvantageous term for her. 
Without equal decisional power or authority, female managers stand to 
lose any future claims of discrimination based on the earlier discriminatory 
distribution of power.  Particularly, continued gender disparity in decisional 
power can begin to justify an employer’s future unequal distribution in 
decision-making.189  For example, if male managers are given early 
opportunity to wield decisional power and do so in a productive manner, then 
they are more likely to be considered for additional opportunities in the 
 
 182. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (“[I]t is ultimately 
the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we 
are governed.”). 
 183. See supra Part I (describing sex stereotyping as one potential cause behind gender 
inequity in decisional processes). 
 184. See supra Part I. 
 185. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 186. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250; see also supra Part I. 
 187. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1034 (5th Cir. 
1980) (recognizing black females collectively as “a distinct protected subgroup” under Title 
VII); see also supra Part I. 
 188. See, e.g., Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that if a jury found that an employer’s concern about employees’ children was a reason for 
denying her promotion, the employer committed sex discrimination).  The court noted that 
this would be an example of a “sex plus” Title VII claim. Id. at 43. 
 189. See supra Part I.C. 
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future.  Female managers who are not offered those earlier opportunities 
cannot prove their capabilities in a similar fashion, even if they possess 
similar or greater talent.  Consequently, lengthy periods of gender inequity 
in decisional authority can then become the foundation for employers to 
justify imposing unequal pay or promotion opportunities between its male 
and female managers.  At this later stage, the differing levels of pay or 
authority may appear justified based on the female manager’s history of 
fewer or less important exercises of decision-making power. 
When an employer exhibits implicit bias in distributing decision-making 
authority, legal precedent would also support a manager’s discrimination 
claim.  For example, in a disparate treatment case, a circuit court found 
implicit bias where a city offered a minority-owned business an economic 
development loan containing more stringent conditions than those reflected 
in its loan offerings to white-owned businesses.190  Rather than alleging 
racial bias, the plaintiff-business presented facts surrounding its interactions 
with the city “from which animus might be inferred.”191  By eliminating the 
plausible, legitimate reasons for the city’s disparate treatment between the 
minority-owned business and the white-owned businesses, the plaintiff 
presented implicit bias as the only rational explanation for the city’s 
behavior.192  This strategy has been effective in several cases involving 
implicit racial bias.193  A similar strategy can be helpful to a plaintiff who 
eliminates all of the permissible causes behind her employer’s distribution of 
decisional power, which leaves only the discriminatory ones.194 
Another court supported a finding of implicit bias by highlighting a 
supervisor’s inconsistent behavior and total absence of written criteria for his 
decisions concerning the plaintiff.195  Such behavioral evidence can be useful 
by a plaintiff making a claim of discriminatory distribution of power and 
authority.  An employee can build part of her argument from evidence that 
her employer facilitates informal decisional structures that do not explain 
why certain managers are unequally allocated their respective decisional 
power.196  Even in the seemingly subtler examples of discrimination, 
plaintiffs can utilize prior courts’ understanding that “subjective decision-
 
 190. See generally Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 191. Id. at 654. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment 
Discrimination Cases—the Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework 
Evidence, 32 LAW & INEQUALITY 309, 327–33 (2014) (describing cases where plaintiffs 
effectively removed all possible explanations for an employer’s behavior besides implicit bias 
to provide a “coherent rationale” for the discriminatory employment practice).  Professor 
Hernández explains that where an employer assesses objective work product differently in 
accordance with a worker’s race, implicit bias framework “helps explain the unexplainable.” 
Id. at 328. 
 194. See supra Part I.B (delineating causes and contributing factors behind gender inequity 
in decisional processes).  The link between the cause and sex would need to be established if 
an employee-plaintiff is to present them to the court. See supra Part II.B. 
 195. See Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 776 (E.D. Wis. 
2010). 
 196. See supra Part I.B. 
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making processes are particularly susceptible to being influenced not by 
overt bigotry and hatred, but rather by unexamined assumptions about others 
that the decisionmaker may not even be aware of.”197  By applying 
previously successful legal strategy, highlighting the absence of sex-neutral 
reasons for her receiving lesser decision-making power, and offering the 
court with long-standing social-science research about sex stereotypes and 
implicit bias, a plaintiff can establish a strong prima facie case for disparate 
treatment and a rebuttal to her employer’s proposed bona fide occupational 
qualification defense.198 
A plaintiff may also succeed under Title VII’s second applicable provision.  
The statute makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or 
classify” an employee in any way that deprives that person of “employment 
opportunities” or “adversely affect[s her] status as an employee” because of 
her sex.199  Applying this provision to disparate treatment theory, a manager 
can argue that an employer that permits factors such as organizational inertia 
or homosocial reproduction to informally weigh managers’ sex as proxies for 
their abilities as decision makers would be legally impermissible.200  A plain 
reading of the statute shows that informal or formal processes that give 
disproportionately greater authority to male managers as compared to female 
managers limit and segregate females from the opportunities commensurate 
with their rank and title.201  Such a distribution process deprives managers of 
opportunities to engage in and learn from projects where they would have 
greater decision-making power.  This process also “adversely affects” a 
manager’s status as an employee because with less experience and decisional 
power, she becomes a less valuable manager respective to her male 
colleagues, who have disproportionately greater power.202 
One hurdle that may deter a plaintiff from filing suit is Title VII’s burden-
shifting framework.203  A proposed cause of action may appear unworkable 
within the third step in the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.  
For parties to reach this step, an employee must establish a prima facie 
discrimination claim, which is often accomplished through circumstantial 
evidence.204  The next step places a minimal burden on the employer to 
provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason for its 
employment action.205  If the employer does so, the employee must 
 
 197. Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1309 (M.D. Ala. 2004). 
 198. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012). 
 200. See supra Part I.B. 
 201. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 202. See supra Part I.C. 
 203. See supra Part II.D.1. 
 204. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (finding that 
comments about the employee’s lack of femininity evidenced sex as a motivating factor 
behind employment discrimination).  It is rare for plaintiffs to support their claim with direct 
evidence because overt discrimination itself is much rarer. See supra Part I. 
 205. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (implying that 
the employer need not convince the court that it acted based on its proffered reason because 
the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion). 
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demonstrate that the proposed legitimate business reason is merely a pretext 
for a discriminatory motive.206  In the context of disparate treatment cases, 
this step is often interpreted to involve unearthing some conscious duplicity 
on the employer’s part.207  Such an interpretation poses a problem for a novel 
gender-disparate decision-making power claim.  As discussed, the gender 
inequity in decision-making processes is likely the result of unconscious 
discrimination such as sex stereotyping, implicit bias, and homosocial 
reproduction.208  Unconscious discrimination lacks the requisite duplicity 
that an employee is expected to uncover when rebutting her employer’s 
proposed motives under the third step in this framework. 
Plaintiffs can and must overcome a court’s expectation that they show their 
employer to be deceitful.  First, the statutory language itself does not require 
a plaintiff to prove her employer’s duplicity to prevail in a discrimination 
claim.209  A plain reading of the cited provisions does not indicate a 
requirement to uncover an employer’s deceit.  Moreover, even the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged as much since McDonnell Douglas.  The Court has 
indicated that “[p]roof that the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of 
credence is simply one form” of evidence that a plaintiff can offer to 
overcome her burden.210  The plaintiff must establish enough evidence to 
persuade a fact finder that the “employer’s asserted justification is false,”211 
not necessarily a lie.  Courts certainly need to more uniformly acknowledge 
this understanding.  However, a plaintiff can support this interpretation by 
making arguments grounded in statutory interpretation and language from 
Court opinions. 
After highlighting the Court’s evolved stance on McDonnell Douglas’s 
third step, a plaintiff can offer examples of her employer’s prior treatment 
toward her, troubling procedural irregularities, or even “the use of subjective 
criteria” through informal or unstructured evaluation schemes to rebut an 
allegedly legitimate business reason.212  Documentation revealing that, in 
reality, the distribution of decisional power is based on stereotypes or implicit 
biases linked to a manager’s sex, rather than profit- or business-related 
 
 206. Id. at 253 (“[P]laintiff must then have an opportunity to prove . . . that the legitimate 
reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons . . . .”). 
 207. See, e.g., Foster v. Biolife Plasma Servs., LP, 566 F. App’x 808, 811 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that the belief that “[a] plaintiff cannot show pretext merely by showing that an 
employer’s good faith belief . . . is mistaken”); Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 
(7th Cir. 2002) (finding that “pretext” means that the employer was deceitful and covered up 
the true motive behind the employment practice). 
 208. See supra Part I.A. 
 209. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 210. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 211. Id. at 148. 
 212. See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(acknowledging a number of ways that a plaintiff may rebut a defendant’s proposed legitimate 
reason for its action). 
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reasons, could be sufficient.213  A plaintiff can overcome the third step in the 
McDonnell Douglas framework even in instances where the employer truly 
did not believe it was discriminating.  Ultimately, even the burden-of-proof 
issue that disparate treatment theory poses is not a prohibitive hurdle if a 
manager frames the alleged business reason as objectively unsound in light 
of other events in or aspects of her workplace. 
C.  Pursuing a Disparate Impact Lawsuit 
Title VII’s second applicable provision makes it unlawful for an employer 
“to limit, segregate, or classify” an employee in any way that deprives that 
person of “employment opportunities” or “adversely affect[s her] status as 
an employee” because of her sex.214  This provision allows for a challenging, 
but feasible, disparate impact claim for sex-based decision-making power 
disparities. 
Applying this provision to a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must dissect 
and show that her employer’s system of distributing decision-making 
authority and power is a facially neutral employment practice that has a 
discriminatory impact.  Aspects of an employer’s practices, such as vague 
evaluative metrics, employer inertia, or homosocial reproduction, can serve 
as exemplary causes of a distributional scheme that adversely impacts 
women.215  The Supreme Court has held that an employer’s use of a 
mandated, non-job-related aptitude test to determine which temporary 
supervisors it would award a permanent status is unlawful.216  Only 54 
percent of provisional African American supervisors passed the test, while 
68 percent of provisional white supervisors passed.217  The Court reasoned 
that because this test effectively barred African American supervisors from 
being eligible for a permanent status based on nonjob criteria, they 
improperly lost employment opportunities.218  Similarly, an employer’s 
failure to change its distribution scheme in a way that produces equitable 
decisional power for qualified members of each sex should be considered an 
improper employee classification system. 
Historically, “objective” tests have been most susceptible to successful 
disparate impact litigation, and employers’ informal processes to assign 
decisional power can be argued to serve as one large test.219  Congress’s 
 
 213. See supra Part II.D (explaining that one strategy to create an inference of 
discrimination is to eliminate all of the employer’s plausible explanations for its conduct, 
leaving only the discriminatory one). 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). 
 215. See supra Part I.B. 
 216. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 455–56 (1982); cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 251–52 (1976) (affirming the acceptability of an employer test that positively related 
to employee training performance). 
 217. Id. at 443. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Pauline T. Kim, Genetic Discrimination, Genetic Privacy:  Rethinking Employee 
Protections for a Brave New Workplace, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1527 (2002) (discussing 
employers’ abandonment of objective tests, which are most vulnerable to disparate impact 
litigation, and noting an overall decrease in such suits); see also John J. Donohue III & Peter 
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intent behind allowing tests or metrics to measure an employee’s 
qualifications in Title VII220 is embedded in the notion that an employer 
should judge an employee “so that . . . sex become[s] irrelevant.”221 
While employers’ distribution processes for managerial decision making 
may not be as transparent as a written test, managers facing discrimination 
can present their employers’ entire distribution scheme as evidence of an 
unlawful employment practice.  Employment practices that effectively 
“‘freeze’ the status quo” from prior practices, such as shifting from a 
structured222 to an informal distribution system, form the basis for a disparate 
impact claim.223  The particular methods by which employers practice 
homosocial reproduction in distributing decisional power also may be 
explained as freezing the status quo. 
A plaintiff may dissect many elements in her workplace that cause a 
disparate impact.  Even if a plaintiff cannot separately identify each element 
of an employer’s distribution process, she may establish a claim by treating 
the process as a single employment practice.224  By way of example, 
programs that protect in-group members and disfavor a recent entrance of 
out-group members would be characterized as an exercise of homosocial 
reproduction.225 
Analogous arguments have succeeded in court.  Specifically, a court found 
that a layoff policy based on seniority, known as a “last-hired, first-fired” 
program, violated Title VII where it disproportionately disfavored female 
police officers.226  The court did not consider the police department’s system 
to be a bona fide seniority system under Title VII because it was preventing 
a newer generation of officers, which included many more women than 
previous generations, from reaching their earned seniority.227  While the 
department offered multiple opportunities for its male officers to sit for a 
patrolman examination, the same exam was only offered twice annually to 
female officers.228  The court concluded that if a female officer could 
establish that but for her sex, she would have been promoted to a more senior 
position such that she would not have been susceptible to the “last-hired, 
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first-fired” policy, then the layoff violated Title VII.229  In that case, unequal 
opportunities to sit for exams among male and female officers helped to 
establish causation.  The gender disparity in officers subject to the last-hired, 
first-fired policy is analogous to those managers facing gender-inequitable 
distribution of decisional power founded on homosocial reproduction or 
employer inertia.  More frequent testing opportunities and greater decisional 
power are both results of processes favoring a homogenous group of 
employees in jobs that are historically dominated by men. 
In the face of a prima facie disparate impact claim, the employer may 
nonetheless prevail using a business-necessity defense.  Such a defense exists 
under the rationale that businesses should maintain a level of autonomy over 
their business decisions.230  An employer who distributes decisional power 
inequitably between managers of different genders or sexes may justify its 
policy as a business necessity.  One possible “necessity” could be that an 
informal process for distributing decisional power maintains quality working 
relationships.  Another possible justification is that its distribution process 
ensures a fluidity for the employer to assign managers for unforeseen needs.  
An employee-plaintiff may overcome such a defense by pointing to 
manifestations of homosocial reproduction in her workplace and providing 
evidence of a feasible alternative employment practice that the employer 
could have taken to obtain a less disparate effect.231 
An alternative practice, for example, would be a multifactor process that 
weighs job-related qualifications or aptitude over more subjective measures.  
Job-related factors would include the monetary effectiveness of a manager’s 
decision making, such as an efficient use of the budget or increased 
productivity from the personnel she manages.  Employers’ reliance on their 
managers’ positive effect on the business or institutional goals would reduce 
or even eliminate the sex disparity in decisional power by removing 
distribution schemes that enable stereotypes, implicit biases, or employer 
inertia to thrive. 
Under particular circumstances, a manager can prevail under either 
disparate treatment or disparate impact theory.  While each bears unfavorable 
characteristics, one theory likely is more promising and preferred than 
another. 
D.  The Most Viable Path to Success 
Disparate treatment litigation presents more favorable odds of success and 
less challenging impediments than a lawsuit based on disparate impact 
theory.  Beyond the relatively less challenging prima facie case to establish, 
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disparate treatment also offers greater incentive for an employee to pursue 
litigation in the first place. 
One prohibitive aspect of disparate impact litigation is the statutory 
scheme’s available remedies.232  Particularly, punitive damages are 
unattainable in disparate impact suits, which may contribute to the dearth of 
litigation in this class of cases.  As high-ranking employees, managers stand 
to lose their reputations, jobs, and wealth in pursuing a novel discrimination 
claim over decision-making power distribution.  For managers working in 
niche markets, where there are few alternate firms for employment, 
managers’ decisions to seek legal redress could have acute repercussions on 
their careers.  Their lawsuits would brand these managers as litigious and 
potentially close them off from employment elsewhere.  Therefore, as a 
logistical calculation, the remedy a manager receives from the litigation must 
outweigh the risks associated with it.  The equitable remedies that disparate 
impact cases offer may make a manager whole, however, they probably 
would not outweigh the risk of stigma from filing the case in the first place. 
Conversely, those pursuing disparate treatment claims are eligible to 
obtain punitive damages.233  In order to do so, plaintiffs must establish their 
employer’s “malice” or “reckless indifference” towards employees’ 
rights.234  With subtle infrastructural processes often causing gender inequity 
in decision-making processes,235 proving a claim for punitive damages 
certainly could be challenging.  But this remedy is not unattainable and it 
helps to balance a potential plaintiff’s risk analysis.  In lieu of punitive 
damages, a court should otherwise apply an equitable reinstatement remedy 
to successful plaintiffs.  Beyond correcting the imbalanced distribution of 
decision-making power, a court may direct the employer to reinstate a female 
manager to the same position that her previously advantaged male colleagues 
have reached.236  For instance, if certain advantaged male managers are 
deemed more immediately deserving of a future bonus or promotion, 
previously disadvantaged female managers should be meaningfully 
considered alongside them.  Employers may also be directed to reinstate a 
female manager by removing any previously created ranking system of its 
managers and starting afresh.  These equitable solutions would reduce the 
risk that future plaintiffs assume through litigation and increase their 
incentive to pursue legal remedies because even if they face stigma following 
their suit, that stigma does not affect their professional status. 
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E.  Judicial Unawareness 
The complete lack of case law raising the issue of sex-disparate decision-
making power suggests that the judiciary may not be aware of the problem.  
Where employers impose subtle but distinct sex-based expectations upon 
their male and female employees, those expectations can become 
professional norms that go unquestioned.237  Historically, women’s rights 
activists eroded such norms by questioning the thinking behind employers’ 
presumptions of sex-based differences between employees—presumptions 
that seemed to warrant their differing expectations.238  Importantly, cases that 
attacked an employer’s presumptions about sex differences among its 
workers were brought to court.239  The only way to raise judicial awareness 
of this novel claim is to bring litigation and once again question 
contemporary presumptions about sex differences. 
CONCLUSION 
As the more overt forms of employment discrimination have subsided, 
women in leadership roles continue to endure inequity that hinders not only 
their careers but also their workplaces’ overall success.  The subtler forms of 
sex discrimination are not at all new; however, they merit more attention 
today.  The plain language of Title VII supports a novel sex discrimination 
claim targeting inequitable decision-making power.  Despite the legal hurdles 
that exist for a plaintiff to successfully establish her claim, litigation is a 
promising way to genuinely relieve the institutional discrimination she faces.  
Managers are unlikely to find success from internal complaints in their 
workplaces because their employers have little incentive to suddenly reform 
their processes for distributing decision-making power.  Distributing unequal 
managerial decision-making power and authority can be subtle and even 
understated if an employer maintains a historical disposition in favor of male 
managers.  Litigation offers long-lasting reform to employment practices that 
produce gender-disparate decision-making power. By applying existing law 
to less perceptible discrimination and changing industry standards of 
decisional power distribution, female managers can secure their own 
professional futures and ensure that their successors are substantively 
reaching the roles they have always worked toward. 
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